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Abstract: We conduct experiments with adolescent participants on repeated fixed play
in three different zero-sum games which have mixed strategy minimax solutions. Further,
we collect subject information on cognitive abilities and participation rates in competitive
activities. We find the adolescents’ correspondences with and deviations from minimax play
largely consistent with previously and widely studied adult populations. Further, we find
strategic sophistication in terms of implementation of the mixed minimax strategy as well
as earnings are not correlated with cognitive ability nor previous experience in competitive
situations.
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1 Introduction
Mixed strategy minimax solutions are qualitatively consistent with aggregate action fre-
quencies, but at the individual level there is excessive heterogeneity in action frequencies
and realized earnings as well as serially correlated action choices. This is the consensus of
laboratory and field tests of the repeated play of fixed pairs from populations such as college
students (O’Neill, 1987; Rosenthal et al., 2003), professional athletes (Walker and Wooders,
2001; Levitt et al., 2010), experienced poker players (Van Essen and Wooders, 2013), human
teams (Okano, 2013), people with schizophrenia (Baek et al., 2013), and primates (Martin
et al., 2014). We replicate the O’Neill and Rosenthal et al. (hereafter, RSW) studies using
students from a middle school in China. We also augment their designs by collecting data
on the participants’ cognitive abilities and participation in competitive activities. Our con-
tributions are two-fold. We identify whether the noted consistencies of behavior in repeated
zero-sum games with mixed strategy solutions is developed prior or post adolescence. Also
we are the first to examine the correlation between strategic sophistication and cognitive
abilities in this environment.
Researchers have increasingly conducted experimental games with children and adoles-
cents to identify when humans develop strategic thinking and some behavioral regularities
inconsistent with noncooperative game theory. Brosig-Koch et al. (2012) find that propen-
sity to use backward induction increases with age. Czermak et al. (2010) surprisingly find
that adolescents play corresponds to pure strategy Nash equilibrium in normal form games
at the same rate as college students, and they more often best respond to their stated beliefs.
A second set of studies, such as Murnighan and Saxon (1998); Harbaugh et al. (2002), have
examined bargaining behavior in ultimatum games, and find that younger subjects will make
less generous offers which are also more willingly accepted. These results raise the question
at what age do pro-social tendencies (Lergetporer et al., 2014) and social preferences (Fehr
et al., 2008, 2013) develop. Our study moves the question at what age do strategic reasoning
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and ability develop to the domain of mixed strategies and strictly competitive games.
Researchers have also shown increasing interest in understanding the link between strate-
gic sophistication and cognitive abilities. The types of strategic sophistication usually consid-
ered are backward induction in extensive form games, steps of iterative dominance in normal
form games, and the induction ability to forecast play of opponents and respond optimally.
Devetag and Warglien (2003) establish positive correlation between levels of iterated domi-
nance and backward induction and subjects’ short-term memory capacities. Carpenter et al.
(2013) extend these results by using multiple measures of cognitive ability, establishing this
correlation also extends to players’ ability to model others sophistication, and make initial
steps in establishing a causal relationship by exogenously shocking the cognitive load of sub-
jects. With respect to repeated p-beauty contests, Gill and Prowse (2013) find that those
with higher cognitive ability choose numbers closer to equilibrium, converge more frequently
to equilibrium play, and earn more than those with lower cognitive ability.
In the context of games with mixed strategy minimax solutions, we propose that strategic
sophistication can take two forms corresponding to alternative rationales of the minimax
solution in zero-sum games. The original minimax rational is that a player solves the problem
and implements the solution of choosing a strategy to secure the largest minimum payoff over
the set of his opponents’ feasible strategies. When the minimax solution is a mixed strategy
and the game a repeated one, the behavioral challenge extends to generating a sequence of
actions that are realizations from a sequence of identical and independent distributions. In
this case we would expect cognitive ability to be positively correlated with the proximity of
action frequencies to the minimax implied ones, and serial independence of the action choices.
The other rational for minimax play in zero-sum games is the logic of Nash equilibrium
where a minimax strategy is the fixed point of the players’ best response correspondences.
Under this best response rational, strategic sophistication does not necessarily correspond
to minimax play, but rather to successfully forecasting opponent play and accordingly best
respond. In this case, strategic sophistication would imply higher repeated game payoffs.
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Our findings summarized. Aggregate action frequencies are inconsistent with minimax
predictions in all three games. With respect to the O’Neill game, we observe aggregate action
frequencies similar to those of the original O’Neill study. With respect to the two versions of
asymmetric matching pennies of RSW, our data is more systematic in that one player role’s
action frequencies matches the minimax proportion while the other matches equiprobable
play. At the individual pair and player level, we find the same strategic heterogeneity
generically found in these studies, as well as serially correlated play. We have a non-result
regarding cognitive ability and experience in competitive settings. Cognitive ability and
experience in competitive outcomes has no correlation on adherence to minimax predictions
nor subject performance.
2 Experimental design
Our experimental design consists of two parts. In the first part, subjects attend a session
in which they complete a survey and then play 100 rounds of zero-sum card game against
a fixed opponent. The second part is an non-timed Raven’s standard progressive matrices
(SPM) test (Raven and De Lemos, 1990), administered two weeks after the first session.
We recruit 128 Chinese students, ages twelve to fifteen, from the Haichang Experimental
Middle School in Xiamen, China. In our survey, we collect the average amount of time per
week spent playing competitive sports. The school provides the age, gender, mid-term math
exam scores.1 We also record the subjects’ Raven ’s SPM scores.2
We conduct three games sessions: one with 40 subjects for the O’Neill replication, one
with 42 subjects for the replication of RSW’s deterministic pursue-evade (DPE) game, and
one with 44 subjects for the replication of RSW’s stochastic pursue-evade (SPE) game.
The protocols are the same for each session.3 Subjects are randomly assigned to pairs and
player roles. At a table, each pair sits side-by-side, separated by partition, and opposite a
1The average score is 85.14 out of 120, and the scores range from 3 to 120.
2The average score is 49.64 out of 60, and the scores range from 27 to 59.
3Please consult the online appendix at xxx, to find instructions in English and Mandarin.
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human monitor. Each player is given a set of action cards, and a polystyrene pad in which
an endowment of push-pins are lodged. Push-pins are the experimental currency which is
exchanged for Renminbi at the end of the experiment. In a stage game, each players selects
a card and places it face down in front of the monitor. The monitor then turns over the
cards, records the actions, rolls a die when necessary (explained shortly), and executes pin
transfers according to the outcome. After the 100 stage games, the monitor pays the subjects
according to final number of pins in their pads. Each session concludes within an hour.
In the O’Neill game, each player has four cards: K, 3, 6 and 9.4 The normal form
representation of the zero-sum game is presented, with Player 1’s payoff shown, in Table 1.
The minimax strategy is the same for each player: play the K, 3, 6 and 9 card with probability
0.4, 0.2, 0.2 and 0.2 respectively.5 The value of the game is -0.2 for Player 1. Prior to the first
stage game, each player is given a forty-five pin endowment. The exchange rate is two pins
per Renminbi. The O’Neill game has been adopted in a plethora of studies, with aggregate
play robustly aligning to minimax. We have chose this game to give adolescent subjects the
“best chance” to play minimax.
Table 1: The normal form of the O’Neill and Pursue-Evade games
O’Neill Game
Player 2
K 3 6 9
K 1 −1 −1 −1
Player 3 −1 −1 1 1
1 6 −1 1 −1 1
9 −1 1 1 −1
Pursue-Evade Game
Evader
Left Right
Pursuer Left 1 0
Right 0 2
In the DPE game, the two players, i.e. Pursuer and Evader, can either play Left or
Right. If both play Left, the Pursuer captures one pin from the Evader. Similarly if both
play Right, the Pursuer captures two pins from the Evader. For the other two action profiles,
4O’Neill (1987) used the following cards: Joker, Ace, 2, and 3.
5According to the theorem of Wooders and Shachat (2001), since each player only has two payoff levels
any equilibrium path of the finitely repeated game consists only sequences of the stage game equilibria.
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the Evader avoids losing any pins. The normal form representation of this zero-sum game is
presented, with the Pursuer’s payoff shown, in Table 1. The symmetric minimax solution is
for both players to play Left with probability two-thirds, and the value of the game for the
Pursuer is also two-thirds. Prior to the first stage game, the Evader is given a one hundred
and thirty-five pin endowment. The exchange rate is three pins per Renminbi.
As the stage game has three payoff levels for each player - the minimax and Nash equi-
librium solutions are not invariant to the players’ risk attitudes. Correspondingly, RSW
introduced the SPE game that only offers two payoff levels to each player in the stage game.
The action spaces remain unchange but the winning rule is augmented to make the capture
reward-penalty probabilistic. The Pursuer captures a single token when both players play
Left and the monitor rolls a 1 or 2 with a six-sided die, or when both play Right and the
monitor rolls a 3, 4, 5, or 6. The normal form game remains the same as the DPE, but the
payoffs are now the Pursuer’s conditional probability of capturing a pin. In the SPE game,
Evaders are endowed with forty-five pins, and the exchange rate is one pin per Renminbi.
3 Data analysis
We start with a data visualization of the three games showing how close individual pairs
play to the minimax predictions, and the play in the original studies. Figure 1 contains three
scatter plots. For each game we plot the joint action frequencies of the adolescent and the
original study pairs. Horizontal and vertical lines mark the minimax and the fifty percent
frequencies. With respect to O’Neill game,6 the adolescents data appears to have a similar
distribution to the original college student data, and is centered around the minimax profile.
In the DPE and SPE games, adolescents play is removed from the minimax strategy. Pur-
suers playing Left around fifty percent of the time, and the Evaders play a higher frequency
than that. Adolescent play also looks different from the original college student play.
6We “collapse” the action set to King and Numbered card.
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(a) O’Neill joint King play (b) DPE joint Left play (c) SPE joint Left play
Figure 1: Scatter plots of joint action frequencies for adolescents and original studies
3.1 Aggregate play
We quantitatively evaluate how well our aggregated data matches the minimax predicted
action frequencies, and the data from the original studies. We assume that action choices
follow a player role specific mixed strategy. Under this assumption the sufficient statistics
for the mixed strategies and distributions of action profiles are the aggregate frequencies of
action choice and joint action play. We present these, along with the minimax predictions
and original studies’ frequencies, in Panels A and B of Table 2. We reject that the mixed
strategies used in our experiments are the minimax ones using χ2 goodness-of-fit tests on
players’ actions and the joint action profiles. The one exception is the Evader role of the SPE
game. We also reject that adolescents follow the same mixed strategies as the participants
in the original three studies.
Next we ask if play is homogenous, i.e. if players in the same role follow the same strategy,
and if the variance of player earnings is that implied by minimax play. We reject, for all
games and all roles, that all players follow the minimax strategy; moreover, we reject there
is any common mixed strategy. Likewise, we reject the variance of the Player 1/Pursuer
earnings is that implied by minimax play. Panels C and D of Table 2 present the details of
these individual tests.
Finally, given the strong evidence of heterogeneity, we revisit the question of whether our
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Table 2: Aggregate play statistics, hypothesis tests of minimax predictions, and testing
homogeneity of adolescents and original play
O’Neill DPE SPE
Panel A: Aggregate action frequencies
Action set (King, 3, 6, 9) (Left, Right) (Left, Right)
Minimax (.40, .20, .20, .20) (.67, .33) (.67, .33)
Adolescent Player 1/Pursuer (.35, .23, .21, .21)m (.48, .52)m,b (.51, .49)m,b
Original Player 1/Pursuer (.36, .20, .22, .22) (.61, .39) (.67, .33)
Adolescent Player 2/Evader (.44, .15, .16, .25)m (.60, .40)m,b (.65, .35)b
Original Player 2/Evader (.43, .17, .18, .23) (.72, .28) (.76, .24)
Panel B: Aggregate action profile frequencies
Action profile set (KK,KN,NK,NN)a (LL,LR, RL, RR) (LL, LR, RL, RR)
Minimax (.16, .24, .24, .36) (.44, .22, .22, .12) (.44, .22, .22, .12)
Adoloescent (.17, .18, .27, .38)m,b (.31, .17, .29, .22)m,b (.35, .17, .30, .18)m,b
Original (.16, .20, .27, .37) (.44, .17, .28, .11) (.52, .15, .24, .09)
Panel C: Heterogeneity - variance of the number of King/Left choices
Minimax prediction 4.899 4.714 4.714
Adolescent Player 1/Pursuer 11.287c,d 7.810c,d 13.916c,d
Adolescent Player 2/Evader 9.451c,d 7.382c,d 15.106c,d
Panel D: Heterogeneity - variance of Player 1/Pursuer Earnings
Minimax prediction 4.899 4.969 4.969
Adolescent Player 1/Pursuer 6.362 9.620c,d 12.498c,d
Panel E: Cross match test for original and adolescent homogeneity
p-value 0.323 0.222 0.285
m Denotes rejection (5% level of significance) of the χ2 goodness-of-fit test, with the hypothesis the common
strategy is minimax.
b Denotes rejection (5% level of significance) of the χ2 goodness-of-fit test, with the hypothesis the Ado-
lescents’ and the Original subjects’ strategies are the same.
a For brevity we treat the set of actions as (K,N) where N is any numbered, i.e. non-King, card. However,
full action sets and profiles are used in hypothesis tests.
c Denotes rejection (5% level of significance) of the χ2 test for variance, assuming minimax implied variance.
d Denotes rejection (5% level of significance) of the χ2 test for variance, assuming all players follow the
same - but not necessarily minimax - mixed strategy.
data and previous data are realizations of the same distribution. We use the cross match test
(Rosenbaum, 2005) that allows each pair’s strategy profile to vary and for tangency on the
empirical distribution functions of the two populations.7 In Panel E of Table 2, we report
the p-values of this test and fail to reject, for all three games, the adolescent and original
7We find such tangencies which precludes us from using the more commonly adopted Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test.
7
data have the same distribution. But note, while valid, the cross match test lacks power
because it does not use all of the sample information.
3.2 Pair and individual level play
Since we reject that the minimax hypothesis holds jointly for all pairs and players, we
test which pairs’ play is consistent with minimax. We test each pair’s action profile with the
null hypothesis of minimax play using a χ2 goodness-of-fit test and a 5% level of significance.
We reject, row two of Table 3, joint minimax play for 50% of our O’Neill game pairs and
for a large majority of our Pursue-Evade game pairs. Under the Nash equilibrium rational
for minimax play in two-person zero-sum games, if one player follows his minimax strategy
the other player will be indifferent amongst the strategies in the support of his minimax
strategy. Accordingly, we conduct a binomial test for each player’s proportion of King/Left
play under the null it is chosen according to minimax frequencies. We reject, rows three and
four of Table 3, the minimax frequency for the majority of individuals except for Player 2 in
the O’Neill game (40%) and Evaders in the DPE game (27%).
We finally test that each action is an independent realization from the minimax mixed
strategy. We evaluate each subject’s sequence of 100 actions using a nonparametric runs
test. The null hypothesis is that every action is an independent realization from a constant
distribution. Rows five through nine of Table 3 show that we reject serial independence for
at least 40%, 20%, and 33% of the subjects’ sequences in the O’Neill, DPE, and SPE games
respectively. For each game, the majority of rejections are due to negative serial correlation.
3.3 Strategic sophistication and cognitive abilities
Surprisingly neither closeness to minimax play or level of earnings are correlated with
cognitive ability or the time spent participating in competitive sports. Our measures of
cognitive ability are the Raven’s SPM test and midterm Math exam scores; our measure
of time engaged in competitive activities is the sum of a subject’s reported weekly times
playing various sports.
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Table 3: Results summary of pair level hypothesis tests of minimax prediction on joint action
profile and King/Left action frequencies; and runs tests for serial independence of actions.
We report the rejection percentages of minimax at the 5% level of significance
Hypothesis test O’Neill DPE SPE
χ2 goodness-of-fit test: action profile is minimax 50% 82% 95%
Binomial test for Player 1/Pursuer minimax play of King/Left 55% 86% 95%
Binomial test for Player 2/Evader minimax play of King/Left 40% 27% 62%
Runs test rejection: negative serial correlation for Player 1/Pursuer 40% 18% 33%
Runs test rejection: positive serial correlation for Player 1/Pursuer 5% 5% 15%
Runs test rejection: negative serial correlation for Player 2/Evader 45% 18% 19%
Runs test rejection: positive serial correlation for Player 2/Evader 0% 0% 10%
To measure the proximity of a participant’s play to minimax, we calculate the modified
Bhattacharyya distance (Derpanis, 2008) between his vector of action frequencies and his
minimax strategy vector.8 To assess the correlation between this distance and our cognitive
measures we calculate the Spearman rank correlation coefficient, which can capture nonlinear
correlations. We report these coefficients in Panel A of Tables 4. No coefficients significantly
differ from zero for own and opponent’s Raven and math scores, nor sports time. We measure
how successful a subject randomizes by using the absolute value of his z-stat from the runs
test, noting a larger absolute value equates to more serial dependence. In this case we only
find three out of thirty-six Spearman rank correlation coefficients are significant - certainly
not enough to make compelling claims.
We finally ask if a participant’s performance is correlated with any of our measures. In
Panel B of Table 4, we see there is no significant correlation between a player’s earnings and
own and opponent’s Raven and math scores, and sports time. The notable exception is in
the DPE game, for which the correlation coefficients between earnings and own Raven and
math score is negative; the opposite sign of our conjecture.
8The modified Bhattacharyya metric is a distance measure between two vectors in an n=dimensional
simplex. For two vectors p, q ∈ ∆n, the modified Bhattacharyya distance is d(p, q) =
√
1−∑ni=1√piq1.
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Table 4: Spearman rank correlation coefficients between cognitive measures-sports time and
minimax strategy-earnings
Panel A: Spearman rank correlation coefficients for distance from minimax and serial correlation
Modified Bhattacharyya
distance measure
Absolute value of the
z-stat for runs test
O’Neill DPE SPE O’Neill DPE SPE
Own Raven score 0.15 0.00 0.25 0.27 −0.05 -0.28
Opponent’s Raven score −0.20 −0.16 -0.16 0.15 0.07 0.21
Player 1/ Own math score 0.27 −0.24 0.26 0.29 −0.19 -0.26
Pursuer Opponent’s math score 0.10 0.15 -0.19 −0.15 0.08 0.04
Own sports time 0.05 −0.01 -0.35 −0.14 0.25 0.05
Opponent’s sports time 0.20 0.15 -0.16 −0.43 0.15 -0.23
Own Raven score 0.05 −0.16 -0.33 −0.24 0.15 -0.17
Opponent’s Raven score 0.17 −0.03 0.16 −0.24 −0.43 -0.36
Player 2/ Own math score −0.23 −0.13 -0.10 −0.67b 0.20 -0.10
Evader Opponent’s math score 0.13 −0.12 0.17 −0.06 −0.49b -0.33
Own sports time 0.40 −0.16 0.11 0.20 0.54b 0.14
Opponent’s sports time 0.37 −0.17 0.02 −0.08 −0.03 -0.36
Panel B: Spearman rank correlation coefficients for Player 1/Pursuer earnings
O’Neill DPE SPE
Own Raven score 0.11 −0.51b -0.21
Opponent’s Raven score −0.22 −0.34 -0.21
Own math score 0.15 −0.52b 0.03
Opponent’s math score −0.37 −0.08 -0.17
Own sport time 0.29 −0.22 -0.32
Opponent’s sport time 0.23 −0.23 -0.38
b Denotes rejection (Denotes significantly different that zero at the 5% level of significance.
4 Discussion
The adolescents in our study have largely reproduced the behavioral consistencies found
when adults play zero-sum games with mixed strategy minimax solutions. Thus these behav-
ioral consistencies likely develop prior to adolescence. Further, we are the first to show that
cognitive ability is uncorrelated with the strategic skill of implementing a mixed strategy
minimax solution, and the ability to detect and exploit deviations of play in this environ-
ment. This suggests that identifying or cultivating individuals who will be successful in such
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situations should not rely upon screening using intelligence tests or other cognitive measures.
What personal characteristics lead to success in such settings remains an open question.
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